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Abstract— Adopting a zonal structure of electricity market 
requires specification of zones’ borders. In this paper we use 
social welfare as the measure to assess quality of various zonal 
divisions. The social welfare is calculated by Market Coupling 
algorithm. The analyzed divisions are found by the usage of 
extended Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) methodology 
presented in paper [1], which takes into account variable 
weather conditions. The offered method of assessment of a 
proposed division of market into zones is however not limited to 
LMP approach but can evaluate the social welfare of divisions 
obtained by any methodology. 
Index Terms— Flow Based Market Coupling, Power System 
Economics, Social Welfare 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The energy market in Europe is undergoing a process of 
transformation aimed at integration of national markets and 
making better use of renewable generation sources. The 
market structure used in many countries, mostly due to 
historical reasons, is the uniform pricing, in which there is a 
single price of energy set on a national market for each hour 
of a day. In spite of its apparent simplicity, such an approach 
has serious disadvantages. The equilibrium set on the market 
does not take into account safety requirements of the grid. 
Hence, (i) the single-price equilibrium set on the market 
(energy exchange) is frequently unfeasible, (ii) the system 
operator has to perform costly readjustments, (iii) costs of 
supplying the energy differ between locations, but they are 
not covered where they arise.
1
 With introduction of other 
forms of market, congestion costs are mitigated and the price 
on the market reflects the true costs of supplying energy to 
different locations in a more adequate way. 
Hitherto, the explicit type of the future pan-European 
energy market remains an open question as the Third Energy 
Package does not specify the design precisely, but the two 
most popular approaches towards which national markets 
evolve are nodal and zonal pricing. The nodal pricing model 
is currently used in, among others, the US and Russia. Zonal 
pricing has been introduced in the Nordic countries as well as 
in Great Britain. This type of pricing is gaining in popularity 
across the Europe, and will be the main subject of this paper. 
Zonal market, which can be thought of as a compromise 
between simplicity of uniform structure and accuracy of 
                                                          
1 For example, in Poland in 2011 the cost of the balancing market 
readjustments amounted to more than 3% (>250 million EUR) of the overall 
costs of production (source: URE/ARE S.A.).  
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nodal one, introduces differentiation of prices between 
regions with distinct costs of supplying energy, but it 
maintains the transparency which the nodal market lacks. The 
grid is divided into geographical regions (zones), each having 
a separate market for the energy with possibly different price. 
Market Coupling (MC) algorithm is used to control inter-
zonal power flows and to calculate prices in zones given 
those flows. This way, under presumption that the zones were 
chosen so that frequently congested lines are on their borders, 
the equilibrium on zonal markets will take into account 
transfer limits on those critical lines. The need for additional 
congestion management is thus minimized, with most of the 
task being performed by the MC mechanism. Of course, 
small adjustments of equilibrium to satisfy limits on intra-
zonal lines might be necessary, but they are expected to be 
less costly than the adjustments on a corresponding uniform 
market. 
Still, there is no consensus in the literature with respect to 
methodology of identification of optimal zones’ number and 
their borders. The existing methods are mostly based on two-
stage approach – assignment of some specific values to each 
of the nodes and division of the system into regions by 
clustering the nodes over those parameters. Among existing 
methods, we can distinguish two popular approaches for 
choosing the values characterizing nodes.  
The first approach is based on nodal prices, called also 
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) [2,3]. Nodal price 
represents the local value of energy, i.e. cost of supplying 
extra 1 MW of energy to a particular node - physical point in 
the transmission system, where the energy can be injected by 
generators or withdrawn by loads. This price consists of the 
cost of producing energy used at a given node and the cost of 
delivering it there taking into account congestion. Therefore 
LMPs separate locations into higher and lower price areas if 
congestion occurs between them. The second approach is 
based on Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs). The 
procedure starts from identification of congested lines, for 
which PTDFs are then calculated. The distribution factors 
reflect the influence of unit nodal injections on power flow 
along transmission lines, thus grouping the nodes 
characterized by similar factors into one zone defines a region 
of desirably similar sensitivity to congestions [4]. 
The main issue that has to be addressed concerning the 
ultimate choice of zonal configuration is the inconsistency in 
determinants used to separate the nodes and in the criteria 
used to evaluate constructed partitions. The two 
aforementioned methods derive divisions from a reasonable 
assumption that congested lines should become inter-zonal 
links, however, the actual shape of borderlines is based on 
several different premises used to (i) label each of nodes with 
a value (e.g. nodal price) or a set of values (e.g. PTDFs) and 
(ii) to group the nodes into geographic areas using a 
clustering technique.  
Since the methods of division assign the values basing on 
data derived from nodal market structure (e.g. LMPs), there is 
a justified need for the assessment which evaluates a newly 
defined zonal architecture. We can broadly divide evaluation 
criteria into those based on safety of the network, which 
include, for example, predictability of the flows on intra-
zonal lines, and those based on economic (market) measures, 
like market liquidity, concentration or social welfare 
(suggested by [7] among the others). In this article we 
calculate and compare social welfare (SW), defined as the 
sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus in the equilibrium 
of supply and demand on the zonal market. Specifically, we 
use mechanism of Flow Based Market Coupling (FB MC) to 
determine the equilibria on each of the zonal markets, taking 
into account the limits of power flows between them.
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As a test case of divisions, we use the results of LMP 
methodology presented in [1], which takes into account 
variable weather conditions and is applied to a simplified 
model of Polish grid, and derive the appropriate welfare 
measures. The exact methodology of Market Coupling and 
calculation of social welfare is presented in the next section. 
In Sec. III we describe the model of network used as the test 
case. The results derived on it are presented and discussed in 
Sec. IV. In Sec. V we conclude and present directions for 
future work. 
II. THE METHODOLOGY 
The zonal energy market can be represented as a set of 
energy exchanges, each governing the trade between 
generators and consumers of energy located in a particular 
geographic area. Energy transfers between zones are allowed 
and are governed by MC mechanism, which takes into 
account the constraints of the inter-zonal transmission lines. 
In order to determine safe supply-demand equilibria on each 
of energy exchanges, the MC mechanism must determine 
how the realization of buy/sell bids translate into (i) power 
injections/withdrawals in the nodes of the grid and into (ii) 
flows on inter-zonal lines. In doing so, the aim of the MC 
algorithm is to maximize the social welfare (consumer 
surplus + producer surplus + congestion rent) while keeping 
the flows in safety limits.  
The mechanism of keeping the inter-zonal flows in safety 
limits can be of varying level of complexity. We use in our 
approach Flow Based MC, which takes advantage of the 
Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF) matrix to 
determine how a particular injection/withdrawal influences 
power flows on inter-zonal lines. This approach is analogous 
to a Direct Current Power Flow (DC PF) model of the flows 
                                                          
2 We use the term “Market Coupling” specifically as the mechanism 
governing the exchange between market zones which are managed by one 
system operator (for example, the case of a national market divided into 
zones, or a common zonal market spanning across more than one country). 
Governance of the flows on the borders of two (or more) not integrated 
markets is not studied in this paper. 
in the grid. As such, FB MC is a significant step-up in 
robustness compared to simpler MC mechanisms, for 
example the Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) MC, which 
limits only the aggregated flow between the zones, without 
calculating explicitly the flows on each of the inter-zonal 
lines. 
We based our implementation of FB MC on the 
description of the COSMOS/Euphemia algorithm [5,8], 
which was derived for the CWE (Central Western Europe) 
energy market.  
A. Input of Offers 
The main input data for the MC algorithm are the buy/sell 
offers of the energy consumers/generators. An n-th offer,  
n = 1,…, N, is characterized by affiliation to a zone j,  
j = 1,…, J, which we denote by nZj and which is derived 
from the physical location of the node where the energy will 
be injected/withdrawn, and by the volume qn to be traded, 
which is coded as a positive amount for a sell bid, and 
negative for a buy bid. The algorithm allows partial 
realization of an offer and also the use of “triangle” offers, in 
which the offer price either decreases (for a buy offer) or 
increases (for a sell offer) linearly on the interval [0, |qn|], 
thus the offer is characterized by two prices, Pn
0
 and Pn
1
, that 
is, Pn
0   Pn
1
 for a buy offer, Pn
0   Pn
1
 for a sell offer. In the 
equilibrium found by the algorithm, each of the offers can be 
either accepted, accepted partially or not accepted at all, 
which will be coded by a coefficient An [0,1]. Thus, an offer 
n accepted in percentage An is connected with an 
injection/withdrawal of power in the amount of Anqn, with the 
highest price in case of “triangle” sell bid (lowest in case of 
buy bid) denoted by 
10 0
( )
n n n nn
PP P P A  . 
B. Flow Calculation 
To calculate how the realization of offers affect inter-
zonal flows for a given vector of zonal injections  
Q = (Q1,…,QJ)
T
 (the aggregated injections/withdrawals 
representing accepted offers in all nodes in a given zone), 
which coordinates are given by 
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we use the nodal PTDF matrix (nPTDF), derived from the 
model of the grid, and the Generation Shift Key (GSK) matrix 
[6] to obtain the flows along K inter-zonal lines (vector 
1
T
( , ..., )
K
Q Q Q ) as Q nPTDF GSK Q . 
To construct the GSK matrix we firstly run the MC 
algorithm with the flows calculated without the use of GSK as 
Q R nPTDF Q , where R matrix selects the flows along K 
inter-zonal lines. The load/generation equilibrium, found for 
such constraints, is used to calculate the GSK matrix, which is 
then treated as input to the “proper” MC FB algorithm’s run.  
C. Objective Function and Constraints 
Maximization of the social welfare is equivalent to the 
optimization problem 
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The safety limits on the K inter-zonal lines are described 
by their capacities Ck, 1,...,Kk  , with vector C defined as  
C = (C1,…,CK)
T
. For the vector of zonal injections Q given by 
(1), the safety constraints on flows in inter-zonal lines, are 
characterized by the condition CQ  , which translates to 
 nPTDF GSK Q C . (3) 
Lastly, we add the balance condition, which states that the 
sum of energy bought on a market of zone Zj and imported to 
the zone Zj must be equal to the energy sold on this market 
and exported from zone Zj, that is,  
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where by from(Zj) and to(Zj) we denote the sets of the inter-
zonal lines along which the energy flows are, respectively, 
withdrawing power from and injecting power into zone Zj. 
The optimization problem described by objective function (2) 
and constraints (3) and (4) is then input to the IBM CPLEX 
mixed integer quadratic solver, and the vector of offer 
acceptance levels A = (A1,…,AN) is derived. 
D. Market Clearing Prices 
When the acceptance levels A are found, we can identify 
the Market Clearing Prices (MCPs) for each of the zone Zj, 
namely MCPj, j = 1,…, J. In general, a clearing price on a 
market is defined as any price for which the aggregated 
supply and demand (taking into account the import/export 
flows) is in equilibrium. Since such price might be not 
determined exactly (there might exist a range of prices 
satisfying the equilibrium condition), we define MCPj in the 
following way, which was chosen to accommodate the non-
elastic demand assumption (cf. section III): (i) if demand in 
zone Zj  was satisfied (for all buy offers in zone Zj we have  
An = 1), then we take as MCPj the highest price of a sell offer 
accepted at or imported to Zj; (ii) if demand in zone Zj was 
not satisfied completely (there exist a buy offer in zone Zj 
such that Aj < 1), then we take as MCPj the common price of 
buy offers, P , as defined in section III. 
E. Social Welfare 
The social welfare in the market equilibrium found by the 
above procedure is equal to 
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where second double sum is the overall congestion rent of the 
system operator (fjk indicates power transfer between adjacent 
zones j and k). 
F. Redispatch Costs 
Since the MC mechanism controls the congestion of only 
inter-zonal lines, there is a possibility that system operator 
will have to correct the generation profile set on the market in 
order to avoid congestion on intra-zonal lines. This process of 
redispatch generates additional costs since some of the 
generation has to be shifted from the cheaper to more 
expensive producers. Thus, in order to better reflect the true 
costs of supplying energy in our social welfare measure, we 
correct the amount (5) by estimator of the redispatch costs. 
To this end, on the load/generation profile acquired as a 
solution from MC, we run Power Flow algorithm to calculate 
flows on intra-zonal lines and we compare them with the 
lines’ capacities. If a line l in zone Zj is congested by amount 
of 
l
o  MW, we add to the cost of redispatch the amount 
max
l j
o P , where 
max
j
P  is the highest cost of generation in zone 
Zj, to obtain an upper bound on the redispatch costs. 
 
III. THE TEST CASE 
To test our approach on an exemplary case which can be 
treated as a relatively close representation of a real energy 
network, we used the data on the Polish grid based on the 
case file included in MATPOWER distribution [6]. This case 
represents the Polish 400, 220 and 110 kV network during 
winter 1999-2000 peak conditions. 
The system consists of 327 power generators, 2383 buses, 
and 2896 interconnecting branches. The quality of the data is 
unknown but the fact that the assumed costs of generation are 
linear gives a premise that these data are of rather poor 
quality. Hence, the analysis should be treated as exemplary, 
with no constructive conclusions for the Polish system. We 
used this specific case since this is the only available one in 
which congestion exists under base case load. Additionally, 
we decreased capacity limits of two specific branches in order 
to obtain more pronounced influence of congestion on the 
MC solutions. A more detailed description of the data can be 
found in [1].  
We divided the grid taking into account variable wind 
generation by using the method presented in [1]. We used 
three variations of our methodology, which reflect division 
for (i) no wind output, (ii) maximal wind output registered in 
the period between years 2007–12, and (iii) so called 
consensus clustering, which reflects aggregation of 722 
different divisions made from various weather conditions into 
one. In each of the three variants we obtained divisions into 2, 
3, 4 and 5 clusters, resulting in twelve divisions to be 
evaluated by the MC algorithm. Each of these 12 divisions 
was then tested in conditions reflecting average wind 
conditions in the period between years 2007–12.  
Specifically, for each division we constructed offers of 
wind generators taking the estimated power output for 
average wind levels and offering it for a price equal to zero in 
order to secure the “sell” of the wind energy, which has 
priority over the conventional generation in the system. For 
conventional generators the energy available for sell, qn = 
pmax, where pmax is the maximal output of the power plant, is 
offered at a constant price (Pn
0 
= Pn
1
), since the costs of 
generation in the used case file are linear. That is, we assume 
that the generators bid the available amount of energy by the 
marginal cost of production.  
From the consumers’ side, since only constant loads at 
each bus are available in the data, we assume that demand is 
perfectly inelastic, namely, that the loads at each bus are 
expected to be covered at any cost. To input such buy offers 
to the algorithm, for each nodal load we use an offer with qn 
equal to the negative of load, and with the price set at a level  
Pn
0 
= Pn
1 
= P  common for all demand offers. In calculations 
presented below we have arbitrarily chosen 2000 PLNP  , 
which is greater than any production cost in the data. Since 
we are interested not in the absolute level of social welfare 
for each proposed zonal division, but in the comparison of the 
social welfares obtained across the 12 different divisions, the 
choice of the demand bid price has no influence on the 
results, as long as this price is equal in every division case 
and is higher than all the sell offers’ prices.  
IV. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Since, as yet, there is no widely accepted methodology for 
choosing the exact number of zones into which market should 
be divided (although there have been some attempts, cf. [11]), 
in our study we assumed the range of the three 
aforementioned variants of divisions (no wind, maximal 
wind, consensus) to, respectively, 2, 3, 4 and 5 clusters, 
which yielded 12 division cases. Then we analyzed each of 
them separately and compared the results of social welfare in 
those 12 cases. In Tables 1&2 we characterize the results 
quantitatively, while Figure 1 delineates the geographical 
placement for divisions into 3 and 4 zones. Tab. 1 shows 
differences between SW, redispatch costs and SW corrected 
by redispatch levels calculated for zonal divisions with 
respect to single-zone market as a reference point.
3
 In the 
case of single-zone market, SW is calculated from the MC 
solution in which there is only one zone, thus no congestion 
management is embedded in market mechanism and all is 
done by redispatch. SW in such case amounts to 47 470 970 
PLN, redispatch costs: 116 589 PLN, SW corrected by 
redispatch: 47 354 381 PLN, marginal clearing price: 147 
PLN. 
The results summarized in Tab. 1 show that, as was 
expected, the (uncorrected) SW in the case of a single-zone 
market turned out to be the highest, since no congestion 
constraints are then put on the market solution. However, 
high redispatch costs associated with correction of this 
solution lead to the lowest corrected SW for single-zone 
market. The best division (with the highest SW corrected by 
redispatch) are related to ‘max wind’ variant for 3 clusters. In 
turn, the worst results are obtained for 2 clusters divisions in 
the ‘consensus’ and ‘max wind’ variants. One can notice that 
the corrected SW rises while redispatch costs drop with 
increasing number of clusters up to 4 (for ‘no wind’ and 
                                                          
3 Namely, the values in Table 1 show the differences between appropriate 
levels for the solutions for market divided into 2, 3, 4, 5 zones and the levels 
for single-zone solution. 
‘consensus’ variants) or 3 (for ‘max wind’) and then both 
become relatively stable. This can be interpreted as a result of 
the most congested lines being taken into account as inter-
zonal constraints into MC mechanism (instead of the costly 
redispatch) when the market is divided into 4 (or 3 in case of 
‘max wind’) zones. Further increasing the number of zones 
does not lead to significant improvement.  
Number of 
zones / type of 
division 
Variant 1 
no wind 
Variant 2 
consensus 
Variant 3 
max wind 
2 
SW -1 585 
-7 144 
5 559 
0 
-3 558 
3 558 
0 
-3 558 
3 558 
redispatch 
SW corr 
3 
SW -1 413 
-7 147 
5 734 
-2 087 
-7 139 
5 052 
-26 357 
-107 163 
80 806 
redispatch 
SW corr 
4 
SW -30 943 
-90 622 
59 679 
-30 130 
-103 082 
72 952 
-27 234 
-107 132 
79 898 
redispatch 
SW corr 
5 
SW -31 460 
-90 645 
59 185 
-30 129 
-103 083 
72 954 
-27 650 
-108 346 
80 696 
redispatch 
SW corr 
Table 1. Social welfare, redispatch costs and corrected SW in relation to 
single-zone market from for grid divisions into two, three, four and five 
zones done in 3 variants - no wind/consensus/maximal wind. 
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Table 2. Qualitative data for division of the Polish power grid into 2,3,4 
zones. Each cell includes values for no-wind / consensus / max-wind variant 
in that vertical order. The colors reflect the areas depicted on Fig. 1. 
Looking at Tab. 2, one can notice that usually in a bigger 
zone the price is lower, in contrary to a smaller zone, where 
the final price is higher than the one for the single-zone 
market (147 PLN). Hence, when the bigger zone gets a lower 
price, then the total SW increases. (However, one must keep 
in mind that we do not include the redispatch costs in the 
prices calculated as in Section II.D, thus the link between the 
MCPs and SW corrected by the redispatch costs, which can 
be treated as the best estimator of market efficiency, is not 
straightforward.) Another reason for the SW divergence 
between the divisions is that demand in tiny zones, especially 
those not having their own generation, is sometimes not fully 
satisfied (thus MCPs there are often equal to 
2000 PLNP  ). In sum, and in relation to SW levels in Tab. 
1, one can see that the division with the highest corrected SW 
(‘max wind,’ 3 zones) is the one which has the smallest MCP 
in the biggest zone, while the demand is fully satisfied in all 
of the zones.   
V. FUTURE WORK  
Among the issues that ought to be tackled in the future 
research we can distinguish two main subjects.  
First, we acknowledge the need for improvement of the 
LMP-based clustering algorithm and development of other 
partitioning techniques that result in all of the zones being 
equipped with their own generation. The partitioning methods 
which produce bigger bidding areas are expected to eliminate 
the problem of exclusively external supply of energy. Also, 
the case of zones which overlap due to interfusion of the 
corridors formed along different types of transmission lines 
(e.g. 220 kV and 400 kV, cf. top right configuration on  
Fig. 1) remains unsolved.  
Second, in the zonal approach all nodes in a specific zone 
are aggregated into one node. The influence of the power 
injected into this zone via transfer through the branches is 
estimated by zonal PTDFs (zlPTDF) matrices [6]. The 
calculation of zlPTDFs requires some assumption about ratios 
between generations/loads and net export which are 
expressed by GSK matrix. Thus, MC has to work with 
inflexible constraints given by GSK, where certain 
proportions between loads and generation are constant. 
In other words, GSK has to be given as an input to MC. 
Thus, its value has to be guessed a priori before MC 
optimization starts. Then, in the optimization process, MC 
can select different combination of generations/loads than the 
one assumed in GSK, which subsequently forces incorrect 
evaluation of constraints.  
Thus, as the consequence of the rough estimation of GSK 
matrices, the MC algorithm operates on unsound 
prerogatives. Both under- and overestimation of power flows 
along the transmission lines lead to suboptimal use of the 
infrastructure [6]. Thus, the process of deriving reliable 
GSK/zonal PTDFs is the central task for enhancement of 
zonal market stability and efficiency. 
  
  
  
Figure 1. Polish grid division for three (left) and four (right) zones. Results 
for no-wind, consensus and maximal wind division variants are shown in the 
top, middle and bottom row, respectively. Arrows indicate direction and 
magnitude of energy transfers between zones in gigawatts. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] K. Wawrzyniak et al., “Division of the Energy Market into Zones in 
Variable Weather Conditions using Locational Marginal Prices,” 
Proceedings of the 39th IECON 2013, 2027 - 2032, ISSN: 1553-572X 
[http://arxiv.org/abs/1310.5022]. 
[2]  B. Burstedde, “From Nodal to Zonal Pricing – A Bottom-Up Approach 
to the Second-Best,” Proceedings of the 9th EEM, May 2012, pp. 885-
892.  
[3]  J. Bialek and M. Imran, “Effectiveness of Zonal Congestion 
Management in the European Electricity Market,” IEEE 2nd 
International Power and Energy Conference, PECon, 2008. 
[4]  C.Q. Kang et al., “Zonal marginal pricing approach based on sequential 
notwork partition and congestion contribution identification,” Electrical 
Power and Energy Systems, vol. 51, p. 321-328, 2013. 
[5] R. Djabali, J. Hoeksema, Y. Langer, “COSMOS description: CWE 
Market Coupling algorithm,” Belgian Power Exchange (BELPEX) 
documentation, 2011. 
[6]  M. Kłos et al., “The Scheme of Novel Methodology Based on Power 
Transfer Distribution Factors and used to Zonal Division of Electrical 
Grid,” submitted to PSCC14, [http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.8192]. 
[7]  ENTSO-E, “Network Code on Capacity Allocation and Congestion 
Management – Purpose and Objectives”, 2012.  
[8]  “EUPHEMIA Public Description,” EPEX Spot, APX, Belpex, Nord 
Pool Spot, OMIE, Mercatoelettrico, OTE, 2013. 
